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Introduction
One of the key developments in interna-
tional relations during the early twenty-first
century is the ascendance of the BRIC
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
(see Box 1 for terms and definitions). While
their rising status stems largely from their
demographic and economic growth (to-
gether accounting for about 40% of the
world’s population and 40% of global GDP
[1]), also important has been what interna-
tional relations scholars refer to as the
growing use of ‘‘soft power.’’ The term
‘‘soft power’’ was coined by Joseph Nye
during the 1990s to describe ‘‘how power is
changing in world politics’’ since the end of
the Cold War. He argued that, while
military force and conquest remain impor-
tant, power derived from technology,
education, and economic growth have
increased in significance. The result has
been ‘‘a general diffusion of power’’ to a
broader range of state and non-state actors.
Given that ‘‘the solutions to many current
issues of transnational interdependence will
require collective action and international
cooperation,’’ Nye argued that govern-
ments must use an appropriate balance of
‘‘soft power’’ (co-option and attraction) and
‘‘hard power’’ (coercion and payment)
when pursuing their interests [2].
This paper examines the process by
which Brazil asserted influence in the
negotiation of the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC) as an example
of soft power. Implemented under the
bylaws of the World Health Organization
(WHO) [3], the FCTC has been the product
of multi-level and multi-actor negotiation
processes that define ‘‘global health diplo-
macy’’ [4–6]. A fuller understanding of
Brazil’s contribution to the FCTC provides
insights into the pursuit of global health
cooperation alongside broader foreign pol-
icy objectives, as well as the emerging
practice of global health diplomacy.
Methodology
As part of a broader project on ‘‘The
tobacco industry, public policy and global
health’’ and our case study of the FCTC
and global health diplomacy, the authors
sought to obtain views of Brazil’s role in the
FCTC negotiations. The authors carried
out key informant interviews with Brazilian
policy makers, diplomats, and public health
advocates on the country’s role in FCTC
negotiations from December 2008 through
January 2009. Interviews were conducted
by LCC in Portuguese, transcribed, and
translated. Triangulation of reported per-
ceptions was achieved through a literature
review of primary and secondary sources
including government reports and Web
sites, industry documents, reports by non-
governmental organizations, and unpub-
lished research dissertations.
This research was approved by the
London School of Hygiene & Tropical
Medicine Ethics Committee as part of the
US National Institutes of Health-funded
‘‘Tobacco control, public policy and global
health’’ project (Application No. 5612). In
addition, interview quotes were approved
by the relevant key informants for citation.
Brazil’s New Prominence in
Global Health
Brazil has become increasingly promi-
nent in international relations in recent
years through its leadership in climate
change [7], trade, energy policy, and
nuclear nonproliferation negotiations [8].
By combining economic growth with
progressive domestic social policies, the
country has defied orthodox thinking on
development. It has been in the realm of
global health, however, that Brazilian
diplomacy has been particularly notewor-
thy, beginning with negotiations on access
to medicines for treatment of HIV/AIDS.
Because of its constitutional requirement
for equity in access to antiretroviral (ARV)
therapy [9], and the political will to
address the issue, Brazil successfully con-
fronted and negotiated a satisfactory
resolution to barriers imposed on drug
availability by the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). With the US government
aligning with powerful corporate interests,
Brazil’s championing of free and universal
access to ARVs earned worldwide respect
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among public health advocates [10].
While other countries, such as Thailand
and South Africa, also sought to challenge
the pharmaceutical industry on restrictive
pricing policies, as Nunn and colleagues
argue, Brazil became the first developing
country to offer free ARV treatment to
HIV/AIDS patients despite claims by the
World Bank that such a policy was not
cost-effective [11]. Importantly, the coun-
try has seen a dramatic decline in AIDS-
related morbidity and mortality as a result
of its treatment program, a success story
that has served as a role model for the
expansion of global support for HIV/
AIDS treatment in other countries. In this
way, Brazil helped bridge a chasm be-
tween public health and trade policy
through its national HIV/AIDS policy
[12].
Brazilian Tobacco Control
Policy as an Exemplar
Brazilian leadership was critical to the
successful conclusion of the FCTC nego-
tiations in 2003. Following the establish-
ment of a model national tobacco control
program, Brazilian medical doctor and
former coordinator of the National To-
bacco Control Programme, Vera Luiza da
Costa e Silva, was recruited to lead
WHO’s Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI),
and Brazilian diplomats were appointed
to chair the Intergovernmental Negotiat-
ing Body (INB) for the FCTC. A fuller
understanding of Brazil’s contribution to
the FCTC process may provide lessons
about the conduct of global health diplo-
macy in other contexts.
Brazil’s National Tobacco Control Pro-
gramme implemented many innovations:
Brazil was the second country (after
Canada) to adopt graphic warnings on
cigarette packages, the first to create a
body to regulate tobacco contents and
emissions, and the first to ban the use of
‘‘light’’ and ‘‘mild’’ terms in describing
tobacco products. According to an inter-
view with Tania Cavalcante, Executive
Secretary of the National Inter-ministerial
Commission to Implement the FCTC,
Brazil promoted these advances in many
INB negotiation sessions, and encouraged
other countries to support them as treaty
elements. Importantly, Brazil’s status as
one of the biggest producers and exporters
of tobacco, while at the same time
achieving high visibility in tobacco control,
provided additional credibility for its
leadership role in the FCTC negotiations
[13]. As diplomat Frederico Duque Es-
trada Meyer, former assistant to Ambas-
sadors Celso Nunes Amorim and Luiz
Felipe de Seixas Correa , put it, ‘‘Some
countries have restrictive anti-smoking
policies like Brazil, but are not producers.
Others, are big producers but with a very
liberal tobacco policy….we were leading
on both sides….we represented both
conflicting interests.’’ In our interviews,
the Brazilian former Director of the TFI,
Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva, further
emphasized this complex negotiating
position:
To be a big producer, a big exporter with a
strong and influential industry, and a big
consumer market for tobacco products, with
pressures in the domestic market generated
by allies of a powerful industry, Brazil
actively supported all the WHO resolutions
that led to the creation of the Intergovern-
mental Negotiating Body. To be a country
subject to all these factors and also able to
implement tobacco control, we were talking
at that time of being a model for other
countries, mainly for developing countries.
We were sending a message that, under any
circumstances, a government committed to
this priority, despite the weight of other
Summary Points
N ‘‘Soft power’’ is a diplomatic approach to obtain an objective through
persuasion and collaboration, rather than through economic influence or
political domination.
N Brazil’s growing influence in international relations, as one of the so-called BRIC
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries, has been due to its effective use of
soft power in key foreign policy negotiations.
N Brazil has shown soft-power leadership in negotiations concerning climate
change, trade liberalisation, energy policy, nuclear non-proliferation, and recent
health-related diplomatic activities. Policy consistency was shown in Brazil’s
constitutional guarantee of access to anti-retroviral drugs for people living with
HIV/AIDS that required steadfast negotiations to ensure access within World
Trade Organization guidelines.
N During negotiations for a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC),
Brazil demonstrated commitment to global health diplomacy by serving as an
exemplar for domestic tobacco control, engaging in coalition politics, and
providing leadership throughout the negotiation process.
N Brazil’s influential role in the negotiation of the FCTC can be seen as an example
of how global health has become a focus of soft power.
Box 1. Terms and Definitions
BRIC countries: An acronym referring to the fast-growing developing
economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The term was coined by investment
bank Goldman Sachs in 2001 in its predictions that, by 2050, the four economies
would together eclipse those of the current richest countries.
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): An
international trade agreement administered by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) that sets out minimum standards for intellectual property regulation.
Signed in 1994, and coming into effect in January 1995, the agreement sets out
requirements that member states meet on such matters as copyright, patents,
trademarks, geographical indications (a name or sign used on certain products
which corresponds to a specific geographical location or origin) and industrial
design.
Antiretroviral drugs (ARVs): Medications for the treatment of infection by
retroviruses, namely HIV/AIDS. Affordable access to such drugs has been the
subject of intense global debate because of patent protections asserted by
pharmaceutical companies under TRIPS and other trade agreements.
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC): An international treaty
negotiated under the auspices of WHO that sets out minimum standards for
national, regional, and international tobacco control measures, including the
setting of broad limits on tobacco production, sale, distribution, advertisement,
taxation, and government policies. Signed in 2003, the treaty came into force in
February 2005. The treaty currently has 168 state parties.
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factors, could still have one of the best
tobacco control programs in the world and
support and adopt a treaty on tobacco
control. (Translated from Portuguese)
Coalition Diplomacy: Bringing
Together Public Health and
Foreign Policy
Brazil’s ability to grapple with the
diversity of interests at the national level,
including a powerful tobacco industry,
began with the establishment of the
Inter-Ministerial National Commission
on the Control of Tobacco Use in 1999.
Backed by the highest levels of govern-
ment, the Commission was a consultative
body to determine the official government
position on the FCTC negotiations. Im-
portantly, nine ministries were represented
on the Commission, including Inland
Revenue, Trade and Development, and
Agriculture [14–15]. This commission,
including all pertinent stakeholders, en-
sured that tobacco control was embodied
in consistent policies throughout govern-
ment and not only as a health ministry
issue. The close involvement of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular,
backed by the highest levels of govern-
ment, ensured a clear and unified en-
dorsement of health goals within Brazilian
foreign policy:
The participation of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Geneva clearly signaled,
largely to tobacco industry representatives,
that the Government was cohesive in its
position against smoking. The Govern-
ment’s stance dispelled any doubt that the
negotiations could only be about health
interests. (Translated from Portu-
guese) [Interview with Ambassador
Santiago Alcazar, former Manager
of Social Issues Unit, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs]
This was an approach that protected
governmental negotiation positions from
the vested interests of the tobacco industry,
and it can be considered one strategy for
the implementation of Article 5.3 of the
FCTC on the protection of public health
policies with respect to tobacco control
from commercial and other vested inter-
ests. Once negotiations commenced, the
government extended coalition building to
civil society organizations (CSOs), which,
through participation in health councils at
the federal, state, and municipal levels,
mobilised to implement tobacco control
interventions [13]. Their role proved
particularly critical in supporting its sub-
sequent ratification by the Brazilian Sen-
ate after the signing of the FCTC by the
Chief Executive.
The need to build a broad domestic
coalition on tobacco control across gov-
ernment, civil society, and the public
health community was heightened by the
industry’s own strategic lobbying of related
economic interests to help it oppose
stronger binding obligations of the FCTC.
As described in an internal document of
British American Tobacco (BAT), released
to the public in the 1990s as a result of US
litigation [16]:
[W]e know how the FCTC will be
negotiated and we know what countries
will be involved. All end markets have been
alerted and key political and legal argu-
ments have been distributed….British
American Tobacco’s response to date has
consisted of attempting to engage in dialogue
with the WHO, running a lobbying
campaign based on legal and political
arguments designed to preserve adults
freedom to smoke, maintain our ability to
trade freely and to raise awareness of the
FCTC’s implications among finance,
trade, agriculture and employment ministers
around the world. We have had some
success in some countries but it is by no
means complete. [17]
Brazil is cited by the industry as among
the key countries where such a strategic
approach was needed.
Faced with this industry threat, Brazil
then extended its coalition building to the
regional and global levels. In addition to
formal FCTC negotiations, informal meet-
ings were held, according to Calvacante,
as ‘‘a strategy adopted by chairs of
different working subgroups when there
was an impasse and consensus could not
be reached.’’ Brazil played an active part
in many of these meetings, especially at the
regional level, she said: ‘‘The objective was
to start sowing regional consensus before
the INB negotiations to speed up the
process. We organised the first meeting for
the Americas region.’’. At the same time,
CSO activity was organised through the
Framework Convention Alliance (FCA), a
worldwide coalition of nongovernmental
organizations and interested parties, which
played an important contributory role in
FCTC negotiations, ratification, and im-
plementation [18]. As Alcazar writes,
‘‘[d]ifferent groups in civil society come
together as an interested party in the
process of implementing an international
treaty. It is as if civil society, as an
interested party—and certainly an un-
structured one—becomes a player on the
international stage’’ [13].
Brazilian Leadership in Global
Negotiations
A strategically important decision by
the WHO TFI was the appointment of
Celso Nunes Amorim, then Brazil’s Per-
manent Representative to the United
Nations and other international organiza-
tions in Geneva, as INB Chair. Amorim
was recognised as a skilled and experi-
enced diplomat, particularly during his
tenure as negotiator in UN talks on
disarmament, trade, and security. The
US delegation described him as ‘‘a steady
hand and [providing] good leadership’’
[19]. When Amorim became Ambassador
to the United Kingdom in 2002, he was
succeeded as INB Chair by another
experienced diplomat, Luiz Felipe de
Seixas Correa. Along with skilful diplo-
mats, Brazil was enabled by the strong
support of the Minister of Health, Jose´
Serra, who recognized that the interna-
tional negotiating process had direct
effects on Brazilian national tobacco
control efforts and public health, accord-
ing to Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva.
As an emerging economy, Brazilian
support for the FCTC was important for
countering industry-led arguments that
tobacco control was a ‘‘first world issue.’’
Despite epidemiological evidence to the
contrary [20], the industry claimed that
the first world, Anglo-Saxon and English
speaking political economies, ... are fuelling
the debate and in many cases driving the
political agenda within the WHO. Most
third world countries have other priorities
but are not able to resist the pace, drive and
political dynamics which are moving the
FCTC forward. [21]
To counter such claims, the TFI sought
to build support within the developing
world. The six deputy chairs of the INB to
lead specific working groups—the US,
Australia, Iran, India, South Africa, and
Turkey—were carefully selected to ensure
both developed and developing country
representation and to encourage regional
activism. The Southeast Asia Tobacco
Control Alliance (SEATCA), formed in
2001, played a similar role. In Latin
America, regional meetings were held to
build consensus within such groups as the
Group of Latin America and Caribbean
Countries (GRULAC) and Mercosur
(Mercado Comu´n del Sur):
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Group meetings of this nature happen
regularly in Geneva and are opportunities
to discuss a diversity of themes, which are
discussed in a diplomatic context. As
Brazil was chairing the treaty negotiations,
it had a privileged forum to amplify the
relevance and importance of what the
WHO was proposing. (Translated from
Portuguese) [Interview with Vera
Luiza da Costa e Silva]
Brazil then used its diplomatic channels
to build linkages across regions:
They not only performed their role during
the meetings, but also took advantage of
meetings with representatives of other
countries and regions at their respective
permanent missions in Geneva to dissem-
inate information about the contents and
scope of the treaty, especially about the
necessity of countries to give priority to this
public health subject in parallel with the
‘‘great star’’ in the city which was the
World Trade Organization. (Translated
from Portuguese) [Interview with
Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva]
The result of this effort was effective
expanded participation by developing
countries in the negotiations:
Those developing countries, which were
under assault by massive tobacco industry
marketing and political pressure campaigns,
have fought back in Geneva, and the
strengthening of the treaty during this last
round of negotiations is a tribute to their
courage and persistence in resisting the
efforts by the United States, Germany and
Japan to weaken the treaty and water down
crucial clauses. Developing countries formed
a strong alliance with NGOs and cham-
pioned our positions during the negotiations.
[22]
Conclusions
Brazil’s leadership in global health
diplomacy must be understood as part of
the country’s political and economic
ascendance in international relations. As
the world’s tenth largest economy, and an
integrated member of the world trading
system, the country’s influence over a wide
range of global health issues is likely to
grow in coming decades. Brazil has
recognised that traditional practices of
hard power can be inappropriate in a
globalized world. Its understanding of soft
power, in the form of normative leadership
and the use of ‘‘opinion-shaping instru-
ments’’ [23], suggests that a new kind of
diplomacy is emerging to achieve collec-
tive action on shared challenges such as
global health. Through its principled
stance on ARVs, and its domestic com-
mitment to strong and effective tobacco
control, Brazil has earned widespread
credibility as a diplomatic leader. This,
in turn, has helped to reinforce domestic
policy on tobacco control. Brazil’s remark-
able example also suggests that engage-
ment in health diplomacy is increasingly
seen as a core component of what it means
to be a global citizen [24].
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